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In Bouterie v. Kleinpeter,l the First Circuit Court of Appeal
rejected a lease cancellation claim involving two royalty payment
delays of eleven months and one delay of twenty months. No putting
in default had occurred. While purportedly recognizing the rule that
"any appreciable length of time without justification amounts to an
active breach which terminates the lease without the necessity of
putting in default, ",2 the court reasoned that failure to pay, to justify
cancellation, must be for an "appreciable period of time and must be
without justification and in bad faith."3 Citing clearly distinguish-
able federal decisions,' the court held that between the completion
of a well and the first royalty payment thereon, there must be some
time lag to effect payments. The trial court finding that there was no
delay sufficient to justify cancellation was therefore affirmed.
The history of lease cancellation jurisprudence based on non-
payment or delay in payment of lease royalty has been more fully
reviewed in an excellent comment under article 137 of the new Min-
eral Code of Louisiana.5 It reflects a shift in judicial concern from
correction of supposed lessee abuses6 to concern over lessor abuse in
unreasonably seeking cancellation for minor injury and petty wrongs
in the absence of a putting in default.'
The Bouterie v. Kleinpeter decision, in overstating bad faith as
a prerequisite to cancellation, is at one end of the pendulum's sweep.
Articles 137 to 141 of the Mineral Code have been enacted at this
historical moment. In requiring a written putting in default,8 furnish-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 289 So. 2d 163 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
2. Id. at 169, quoting Bouterie v. Kleinpeter, 258 La. 605, 247 So. 2d 548 (1971)
(italics omitted).
3. 289 So. 2d at 169 (emphasis added).
4. Bonsall v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 201 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. La. 1961), aff'd, 300
F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1962) (20 month delay justified by legal uncertainties over effect of
compulsory unit on prior voluntary unit and efforts to obtain division order to over-
come problem); Touchet v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 191 F. Supp. 291 (W.D. La. 1960)
(3 months delay).
5. LA. R.S. 31:137 (Supp. 1975).
6. See, e.g., Melancon v. Texas Co., 230 La. 593, 89 So. 2d 135 (1956) (coercive
conduct).
7. See, e.g., Hebert v. Sun Oil Co., 223 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969) (clerical
error and small royalties).
8. LA. R.S. 31:137 (Supp. 1975).
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ing a highly conditioned remedy of double damages,' and expressly
disfavoring cancellation,' the Mineral Code has all but buried the
remedy of cancellation for delay in payment of royalties. Indeed, its
very limited damage remedy raises a question whether there has been
a meaningful substitute remedy furnished to the lessor for substantial
neglect in payment of royalties. Dean George W. Hardy, III had cor-
rectly discerned that the "real problem" is to furnish some "meaning-
ful remedy" while avoiding the harshness of a cancellation remedy
affecting large investments as a consequence of non-payment of insig-
nificant sums." Requiring a lessor (who may be totally ignorant of
new production on an already producing lease) to notify in writing a
lessee (who probably knows of his non-payment and may be enjoying
every high interest minute of it) may sometimes suggest injustice.
Limiting the remedy to interest (absent fraud or willful conduct) and
then making damages for fraud a discretionary matter" further sug-
gests possible want of "meaningfulness." Even if a lessee is fraudu-
lent, willful, and ignores demands, still the lessor does not have a
remedy guaranteed as a matter of right, given the discretionary form
of language em Ployed in articles 139 and 140." For other cases, in-
cluding oversight or neglect, all the Mineral Code has provided as a
new "meaningful" remedy is the old meaningless remedy of interest,
plus a weak attorney's fee provision which may require a second
putting in default. Thus, it has furnished an illusory remedy for the
lessor who may not always be the villain of a legal ambuscade, but
who can sometimes be the victim of negligent delay at best, and
difficult-to-prove bad faith delay at worst.
This has a familiar ring. It is fundamentally the same situation
that the supreme court faced when it developed the "active breach"
jurisprudence to overcome supposed ill practices in non-payment of
royalty for which the Civil Code regime was inadequate to do justice.
However, there is a critical difference at present. The industry does
not now have the same reputation of unreasonable delays it labored
under in the 1950's and early 1960's. The cases of the past decade
have generally not involved harsh lessee abuses nor negligence suffi-
ciently gross to outweigh the frequent appearance of lessors "lying in
9. LA. R.S. 31:139-40 (Supp. 1975).
10. LA. R.S. 31:139, 141 (Supp. 1975).
11. See comment to LA. R.S. 31:137 (Supp. 1975). To a small landowner, the sums
may not seem insignificant.
12. LA. R.S. 31:139 (Supp. 1975).
13. Both articles provide only that a court "may," not that a court "shall" award
double the royalty due as damages. LA. R.S. 31:139-40 (Supp. 1975).
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wait" to benefit from jackpot remedies. 4 Nonetheless, old cases from
the other end of the pendulum's sweep, for example, Pierce v. Atlan-
tic Refining Co. ,15 should remain required reading for legal and mana-
gerial staff. However, their mere memory may not suffice to give
balance to short term business judgments on whether it is in a com-
pany's interest to expend resources on reducing the length of time
that company may enjoy its lessor's funds. If a more meaningful
remedy is not legislatively provided to be respected in business deci-
sions, the past could become the prologue of court decisions. The
Mineral Code article 137 notice provision could be judicially eroded
just as the Civil Code putting in default rules were eroded.
JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENTS
Superior Oil Co. v. Cox"5 posed a joint operating agreement prob-
lem. Due to the comparative infrequency of this type of litigation and
the widespread use of operating agreements, the decision has a cer-
tain importance for contract drafting, although it did not decide any
weighty legal questions. The case principally involved a liberal inter-
pretation given an "acreage contribution" sharing clause in the cost
participation provisions, which is the heart of most farmout and oper-
ating agreements. The decision may suggest a judicial tendency in
factfinding to construe doubtful clauses in favor of those who have
borne the costs of a venture, although it does not expressly articulate
such a rule.
PIPELINE CONTRACTS
Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp. v. Muller7 presented seVeral
minor questions involving delays in payment by a pipeline company
to a producer and the use of concursus proceedings. All questions
were resolved in favor of the pipeline company, including a contract
14. Wilson v. Sun Oil Co., 290 So. 2d 844 (La. 1974) presented a good example of
the kind of factual situations which have caused the courts of this state, and ultimately
the legislature, to develop a distaste for the remedy of lease cancellation for delay in
payment of royalty. Correspondence in regard to division orders was not answered.
Only two to four months of delay were involved. The plaintiffs were already in litiga-
tion on another lease. The alleged nonpayment only related to six percent of the
royalties due. The delay was associated with problems over the extent of acreage
involved. Needless to say, cancellation was denied.
15. 140 So. 2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) (lease cancellation granted for seven
months delay in payment of royalties, caused by innocent confusion in a corporate
reorganization).
16. 290 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
17. 290 So. 2d 888 (La. 1974).
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interpretation question on liability for interest for funds not unrea-
sonably withheld. As in the matter of delays in payment, it seems
unjust for anyone to benefit from the holding of another's funds, even
though there is just reason or agreement that the funds may be with-
held, if the monies are clearly not the property of the holder. Other-
wise, "reasons" to hold funds are likely to abound. Principles of un-
just enrichment or agency might be considered for an appropriate
case' 8 and attorneys should devote care to this problem in contract
drafting.
LESSOR-SUBLESSEE RELATIONS
Scurlock Oil Co. v. Getty Oil Co."9 treats several problems in a
lease cancellation controversy between a lessor and sublessee. The
decision follows established general precedent as to the stricti juris
application of res judicata rules. It refused to apply as controlling a
prior decision governing the lessee's rights. As indicated in a concur-
ring opinion by Justice Barham, the opinion of the court implicitly
and correctly upholds horizontal segregation of mineral lease rights
as permissible. 0 The most important aspect of the case relates to
obiter dictum that a release by a lessee-sublessor destroys the rights
of a sublessee. Such a result was avoided by interpreting the intent
of the instrument of release. It would have been "irrational," the
court reasoned, for such a result to have been intended. Presumably,
the law is irrational under the court's view, for the court reasoned
that absent the intent it construed out of this release, the law would
have required a sublessee's rights to be extinguished by an act of
release clearly contrary to the sublessor's obligations of warranty to
his sublessee.
It is essential that there be security of title for a sublessee. The
sublessee is normally the operator and risks large capital in explora-
tory and development work. It would be "irrational" for his title
security to a real right to be dependent only upon the purely personal
18. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 3005.
19. 294 So. 2d 810 (La. 1974).
20. Id. at 821 (Barham, J., concurring). Actually, Justice Barham noted the ma-
jority opinion stated it had pretermitted the question of horizontal segregation, while
in fact deciding in favor of horizontal segregation. This is not perfectly precise. In fact,
the majority stated that it was not reaching the question of whether horizontal segrega-
tion effects an assignment or a sublease. 294 So. 2d at 819. But Justice Barham was
essentially correct in observing the effect of the opinion is to uphold a horizontal
segregation. The true question may be whether a particular horizontal segregation is
an assignment or sublease, as it is conceivable that there might be horizontal assign-
ments and horizontal subleases. See LA. R.S. 31:130 (Supp. 1975).
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obligations of a sublessor. Irrationality was not intended by the legis-
lature. If an unreasonable result flows from mechanically logical de-
ductions from a legalistic premise, then the premise ought to be ex-
amined to see if it is indeed a universally valid premise. The premise
that a sublease is dependent on the continued existence of the lease2
should not be construed as permitting a sublessor to terminate real
rights"2 theretofore transferred to others, whether by assignment or
sublease, notwithstanding that the traditional view has been that the
lessor's direct legal relationship is with the lessee, not a sublessee.
Legalistic analysis of lease vs. sublease rules to the contrary notwith-
standing, a lessor commonly knows that a lease broker, taking a lease,
by the very nature of his occupation, will not be the real operator to
whom the lessor will be looking for future contract performance.
Thus, the parties know the real venturer will often be a person other
than the original lessee. To imagine that a lease brokerage firm which
had retaineda small override, thus making an "assignment" a sub-
lease, had thereby retained the power to destroy the sublessee's in-
vestment, is to imagine unconscionable results ordinary people could
never understand.
The new Mineral Code realistically recognizes the true economic
relationships, by recognizing a direct lessor-sublessee relationship.23
It should furnish a means to avoid the rule implied in the dictum
under discussion, since the power to grant a release would be one of
the rights and powers of the original lessee acquired by a sublessee
under the new Code.
OYSTER DAMAGE CLAIMS
The court in Jurisich v. Louisiana Southern Oil and Gas Co.24
gave a state mineral lessee and its dredging contractor a Pyrrhic
victory over an oyster lessee. The court squarely held that a mineral
lessee is not responsible for oyster damages from necessary and pru-
dent mineral operations reasonably conducted with proper precau-
tions. Having given this legal victory to the defendants, a $12,000
oyster bed damage claim was nonetheless affirmed on the ground that
the damages were caused by fault in the mineral operations. The
fault consisted of failure to notify the oyster lessee and failure to use
21. Now codified as LA. R.S. 31:126 (Supp. 1975).
22. See LA. R.S. 31:16 (Supp. 1975).
23. LA. R.S. 31:128 (Supp. 1975). This article provides that to the extent of the
interest acquired, an assignee or sublessee becomes directly responsible to the original
lessor, and "acquires the rights and powers of the lessee."
24. 284 So. 2d 173 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
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a circuitous route which would have avoided damage to oyster beds.
Realistically, oil well canals are also future navigational routes and
need to follow straight lines, unless crew boat operators' safety is
worth less than oysters. Boyd Professor Wex Malone once commented
about a similar oyster damage decision:25 "One might conjecture
whether such a case as this really rests upon negligence ... .
AREA OF INTEREST CLAUSES
In Wurzlow v. Placid Oil Co.,27 the court interpreted the word
''prospect" in a lease brokerage contract providing for an overriding
royalty on new leases taken in a named "prospect." It had not been
precisely defined and the ambiguity was construed against the oil
company which had drafted the agreement, thus affording recogni-
tion to the lease broker's claim to overriding royalty interest in cer-
tain oil and gas leases. The facts of the case are lengthy and complex.
They illustrate the kind of complex controversy which can arise if
precision of description is not employed in area of interest agree-
ments. However, definition with exactitude may be impossible until
fruits of the transaction-information from drilling-materializes.
The court recognized this difficulty and used Civil Code article 1947
to sustain its holding that a "prospect" is a term of art or technical
phrase to be interpreted according to its meaning with those who are
in the art or profession. Parol evidence was accordingly considered.
The decision seems both just and legally correct, assuming validity
of the factual findings reached through use of parol. Very impor-
tantly, the court pointed to careful distinctions in ambiguous descrip-
tion cases where rights of third persons were or were not involved.
Thus, the decision may have limited future application only to cases
where third party rights are not affected.
25. Doucet v. Texas Co., 205 La. 312, 17 So. 2d 340 (1944).
26. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1943-1944 Term-Torts, 6
LA. L. REV. 204, 213 (1945).
27. 279 So. 2d 749 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
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